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ABSTRACT  
 
The chapter provides a broad overview to the topic of search engine liability for 
copyright infringement. In doing so, the chapter examines some of the key copyright 
law principles and their application to search engines. The chapter also provides an 
import discussion of some of the most important cases to be decided within the courts 
of the United States, Australia, China and Europe regarding the liability of search 
engines for copyright infringement. Finally, the chapter will conclude with some 
thoughts for reform, including how copyright law can be amended in order to 
accommodate and realise the great informative power which search engines have to 
offer society.   
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution and development of search engines over the past ten years to their 
current level of sophistication, poses a number of challenging legal issues to the area 
of copyright law. While search engines like Google have rapidly expanded their 
online services and activities, copyright law for its part, has largely failed to 
adequately respond to these technological developments and advances. Instead, the 
result has been rigid copyright laws being applied to the types of online activities, 
which were never contemplated when the original legislative provisions were drafted 
causing great ambiguity and uncertainty.  
 
Search engines also play a vital role in ensuring the free flow of the Internet and its 
core purpose – access to information. However, copyright laws by their very nature, 
fundamentally challenge this concept of a freely accessible and flowing Internet. This 
conflict was alluded to in a recent decision of the United States District Court, where 
the Court held that the principal legal issues for search engines arise: 
 
out of the increasingly recurring conflict between intellectual property rights on the 
one hand and the dazzling capacity of internet technology to assemble, organize, 
store, access and display intellectual property “content” on the other hand.1   
 
Indeed, it has been argued that the revolution which search engines have brought to 
the Internet world, has only been made possible by the fact that search engines have 
been able to exercise many of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, which 
would not have been possible in the non-digital based world.2    
                                                 
1 Perfect 10 v Google Inc, 416 F Supp 2d 828, 831 (CD Cal, 2006).  
2 Graham Greenleaf, ‘Creating commons by friendly appropriation’ [2006] AIPLRes 10 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/AIPLRes/2006/10.html. 
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The following chapter will provide a broad overview of the liability of search engines 
for copyright infringement. In doing so, the chapter will examine some of the most 
important cases to be decided within the United States, Australia, China and Europe 
regarding the lability of search engines for copyright infringement. Finally, the 
chapter will conclude with some thoughts for reform, including how copyright law 
can be amended in order to accommodate and realise the great informative power 
which search engines have to offer society.   
 
 
II COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
 A Copyright principles  
Much of the digital content distributed through the Internet, or available for viewing 
or downloading at internet locations, is protected by copyright. However, the 
conceptual basis and core principles of copyright law were established centuries 
before digital era technologies, like search engines were invented. Copyright emerged 
in the late 15th century, in the years following the invention of the printing press. 
Over the ensuing centuries the scope of copyright expanded incrementally to 
encompass new forms of creative material, as well as new ways of distributing those 
materials, that have been made possible by rapid advances in technology. As new 
ways of expressing and exploiting creative materials have been developed, the 
exclusive rights conferred on creators have been reformulated and extended with the 
aim of ensuring that creators may reap the rewards of their efforts.3  
 
Dating back to the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works 1886 there have 
also been a variety of international treaties covering copyright law. The multilateral 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994, World 
Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty 1996, World Intellectual 
Property Organisation Performers and Phonograms Treaty 1996 and bilateral free 
trade agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004 are 
also part of this landscape. These treaties which seek to harmonise copyright law 
across the world tend to be implemented through national or domestic law, such as the 
Copyright Act or Code in each country. An example of this is TRIPS, which requires 
member countries to enact copyright laws that uphold the Berne Convention and to 
ensure that adequate enforcement mechanisms are in place. A failure to do this can 
lead to the non-complying member being taken to the World Trade Organisation’s 
Dispute Settlement Body and trade sanctions imposed.4   
 
The Berne Convention sets up a system of copyright law where the creator or author 
is the copyright owner at the outset, but they can (and often do) assign their copyright 
to a commercialising agent, such as a publisher who then becomes the copyright 
owner. Copyright attaches to subject matter such as literary, musical, dramatic and 
artistic works (including photographs), sound recordings and film. A song for instance 
                                                 
3 For an overview of the origins and evolution of copyright see Anne Fitzgerald and Brian Fitzgerald, 
Intellectual Property in Principle (2004) 82-84.  
4 For example see the United States complaint filed against China, Lori Montgomery and Ariana 
Eunjung Cha, Taking a Harder Line on Piracy (2007) The Washington Post 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/09/AR2007040900574.html>. 
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can be made up of a literary work (lyrics), musical work (score) and a sound 
recording, with the different aspects owned by different copyright owners. In most 
countries except the United States (where such personal rights in copyright law are 
very limited) creators or authors hold moral rights to be attributed as the author of 
copyright material and to ensure the integrity of their work (not to have it mutilated in 
such a manner as to cause dishonour). These rights are not usually assignable, but in 
some countries they can be waived or overridden with consent. However, in some 
countries, like France and Germany waiver is not possible.  
 
Moral rights stay with the creator or author, while economic rights remain with the 
copyright owner. The key economic rights give the copyright owner power to control 
things such as reproduction and communication to the public. If any of these rights 
are exercised, the permission of the copyright owner will normally be required unless 
one of the exceptions under the various copyright laws that allow use of copyright 
material without the permission of the copyright owner applies. In the United States 
the fair use provision allows a broad range of uses without permission, for purposes 
such as parody or critique, while in other countries narrower notions, such as fair 
dealing allow strictly controlled use for research or study, parody or satire, news 
reporting and criticism or review. There may also be statutory licences (eg for private 
or educational use) that allow the use of the material without the permission of the 
copyright owner if compensation is paid.  
 
In addition to liability for the primary infringement of copyright, in most jurisdictions 
there are also provisions, whereby third parties can be held liable for authorising (or 
contributing to) copyright infringement. The rationale behind such provisions are that 
third parties are in many cases in a better position to discourage copyright 
infringement, either by monitoring primary infringers or redesigning their 
technologies to make infringement more difficult. Generally, since authorising others 
to do an act in relation to copyrighted material is one of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights, copyright will also be infringed by authorising another person to do 
the infringing act without the licence of the copyright owner.5 However, in 
considering whether an infringement of copyright has been authorised by a third 
party, it is always necessary to first establish a primary act of infringement that has a 
causal connection to the act or acts of authorisation.  
 
Similarly, in one of the most important jurisdictions for search engines, the United 
States, the Courts have also held third parties liable for copyright infringement under 
two long standing common law doctrines of contributory infringement6 and vicarious 
liability7. Under the doctrine of contributory infringement, a third party can be held 
liable for indirectly infringing copyright where they have knowledge of the infringing 
activity and either induce, cause or materially contribute to the infringing conduct of 
another. While, under the doctrine of vicarious liability a third party can be held liable 
where they have the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and have a 
direct financial interest in the activities.  
 
                                                 
5 For example under Australian law see Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1) 101(1). 
6 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co v HL Green Co, 316 F3d 304 (2d Cir 1963). 
7 Gershwin Publishing Corp v Columbia Artists Management Inc, 443 F2d 1159 (2d Cir 1971).  
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It should also be noted that in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd,8 the 
Supreme Court of the United States introduced an additional form of third party 
liability for copyright law, the doctrine of inducement. Under this doctrine the 
Supreme Court held that: 
 
one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.9  
 
Importantly, for search engines and other online intermediaries, provisions exist in 
most jurisdictions called ‘safe harbours’ which – although not always providing a 
complete defence to copyright infringement – act to mitigate liability by limiting the 
remedies available against third parties for copyright infringement in certain 
circumstances. In the United States, ‘safe harbor’ provisions exist under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act 199810. These provisions immunise search engines, internet 
access providers, telecommunication companies and other online service providers 
from secondary liability for copyright infringement providing these entities first 
satisfy a number of specific requirements which are designed to safeguard the 
interests of copyright holders.11 Similarly, in other jurisdictions, like Australia, ‘safe 
harbour’ provisions also exist, although arguably their operation, at least in Australia, 
is much narrower than other jurisdictions.12  
 
B Copyright issues for search engines 
Copyright law raises a number of challenging legal issues for search engines, 
particularly in regard to the reproduction and communication to the public of any text, 
images or sound recordings. Importantly, search engines do not own content, but 
instead organise and provide access to the vast store of material that is posted on, or to 
websites and the Internet, generating revenue by selling advertising. Since much of 
the activity carried out by search engines involves the reproduction of copyright 
content that has been made available on the Internet by third parties, in many cases 
questions of copyright infringement are likely arise. It also should be noted, that the 
types of copyright issues which will arise are likely to vary to some degree depending 
upon the nature of the search engine and the services provided by that search engine.13  
                                                 
8 545 US 913 (2005); Mark Radcliffe, ‘Grokster: The new law of third party liability for copyright 
infringement under United States law’ (2006) 22 Computer Law and Security Report 137, 144. 
9 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd, 545 US 913, 919 (2005). 
10 § 512(c) 17 USC. 
11 See Craig Walker ‘Application of the DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions to Search Engines’ (2004) 9(2) 
Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 1. While the safe harbors contain specific 
provisions/immunity for caching and information location tools and thereby provide search engines 
with some level of certainty, they are conditional upon strict requirements relating to knowledge, 
financial benefit and the type of caching. This serves to complicate and restrict their application. A 
number of the cases discussed below fall outside the safe harbors for these reasons. On the 
requirements of the safe harbors see Perfect 10 Inc v CCBill LLC, 481 F 3d 751 (9th Cir, 2007). 
12 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 116AA-116AJ; also see Damien O’Brien and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Digital 
copyright law in a YouTube world’ (2006) 9 (6 & 7) Internet Law Bulletin 71, 73-74 
<http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00007505>. 
13 For example additional copyright issues may arise for video sharing websites or blogs being hosted 
or provided by search engines see Damien O’Brien and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Digital copyright law in a 
YouTube world’ (2006) 9 (6 & 7) Internet Law Bulletin 71 
<http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00007505>; Damien O’Brien, ‘Blogs and the Law: Key Legal Issues 
for the Blogosphere’ forthcoming Media and Arts Law Review; Peter Black, Hayden Delaney and 
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A series of United States cases during 2006 considered whether the ‘fair use’ doctrine, 
or the notion of an ‘implied licence’ could protect Google from liability for copyright 
infringement in its day-to-day activities. The outcome of these cases has been 
somewhat uncertain and it is too early to predict how the law will settle in this area. 
However, as Google becomes one of the most valuable companies in the world by 
providing access and search services and as other players assume copyright interests, 
it is expected that further challenges will emerge in regard to the liability of search 
engines for copyright infringement.  
 
 
III CASE LAW  
 
A United States 
The majority of decisions to have emerged from the courts involving search engine 
liability for copyright infringement have been from the United States, where the 
majority of search engines are based.  
 
1 Field v Google Inc  
One of the first cases to have considered the legality of caching by a search engine 
was Field v Google Inc,14. In this case, the Nevada District Court held that Google did 
not infringe copyright when they copy websites, store copies and enable them to be 
downloaded by Internet users as a part of the Google cache feature.15 The plaintiff, 
Field, an author and attorney brought an action for copyright infringement against the 
search engine Google, claming that they infringed his copyright when they 
automatically cached and copied a story he had posted to his website.16   
 
At issue in this case were five claims by Field that Google’s caching practices 
breached copyright law.17 However, the Court rejected all five of Field’s claims, 
holding five different defences protected Google from Field’s claims that their 
caching practices breached copyright.18 In doing so, the Court held that:  
1. Google did not directly infringe copyright when Internet users downloaded 
pages from the Google cache, because there was no volitional act present;19 
2. Google was given an implied licence by the copyright owner where they know 
of the use and encourage it (for example, in this case despite knowing about 
the ‘no-archive’ meta-tag, Field chose not to use it);20 
3. Google was entitled to rely upon the doctrine of estoppel;21 
                                                                                                                                            
Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Legal Issues for Wikis: The Challenge of User-generated and Peer-produced 
Knowledge, Content and Culture’ forthcoming Murdoch e Law Journal.   
14 412 F Supp 2d 1106 (District Court of Nevada, 2006).  
15 Field v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1109 (District Court of Nevada, 2006). 
16 Field v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1113-1114 (District Court of Nevada, 2006). 
17 See Ben Kociubinski, ‘Copyright and the Evolving Law of Internet Search – Field v. Google, Inc. 
and Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.’ (2006) 12 Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 
372, 372-378; Nicole Bashor, ‘The Cache Cow: Can Caching and Copyright Co-Exist?’ (2006) 6 The 
John Marshall Law School Review of Intellectual Property Law 101. 
18 Field v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1109 (District Court of Nevada, 2006). 
19 Field v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1114-1115 (DC Nev, 2006). 
20 Field v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1115-1116 (DC Nev, 2006). 
21 Field v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1116-1117 (DC Nev, 2006). 
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4. Google’s caching practices were a fair use, as they were transformative in 
nature and there was no evidence that Google intended to profit from the 
caching;22 and 
5. Google was entitled to rely upon the ‘safe harbor’ provisions for intermediate 
and temporary storage.23  
 
2 Parker v Google Inc  
Following the decision in Field v Google Inc,24 a similar action was brought against 
Google for direct copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In Parker v Google Inc,25 Parker, an author, claimed 
that Google had directly infringed copyright by automatically archiving a copy of his 
posting (a chapter of one of his e-books) he put on USENET, an online bulletin 
board.26 Parker also alleged that Google directly infringed copyright by providing 
users of the search engine with a list of links in response to a search query, with 
excerpts of his website contained within the list of links.27  
 
However, the Court rejected Parker’s claims of direct copyright infringement in the 
archiving of his USENET posting, by holding that Google’s activities fell within 
those of an Internet service provider and thus did not constitute copyright 
infringement.28 Importantly, the Court found that Google did not have the requisite 
volitional conduct to support a finding of direct copyright infringement. In this regard, 
the Court stated: 
 
[w]hen an ISP automatically and temporarily stores data without human intervention 
so that the system can operate and transmit data to its users, the necessary element of 
volition is missing.’29  
 
The Court also dismissed Parker’s claim of direct copyright infringement through 
indexing and caching websites on the basis of a failure to state a claim on which relief 
can be granted.30 In briefly addressing this issue, the Court stated that s 512(b) of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 199831 and the decision in Field v Google Inc,32 
meant that Google was entitled to rely upon the ‘safe harbor’ provisions for its system 
caching activities. The Court also rejected Parker’s claims against Google for 
contributory copyright infringement and vicarious copyright infringement.33   
  
3 Kelly v Ariba Soft Corporation 
The legality of linking by search engines has also been considered in a number of 
recent United States cases. Kelly v Arriba Soft Corporation,34 involved a dispute 
                                                 
22 Field v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1117-1123 (DC Nev, 2006). 
23 Field v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1123-1125 (DC Nev, 2006). 
24 412 F Supp 2d 1106 (DC Nev, 2006).  
25 422 F Supp 2d 492 (ED Pa, 2006). 
26 Parker v Google Inc, 422 F Supp 2d 492, 495 (ED Pa, 2006). 
27 Ibid.  
28 Parker v Google Inc, 422 F Supp 2d 492, 496-498 (ED Pa, 2006). 
29 Parker v Google Inc, 422 F Supp 2d 492, 497 (ED Pa, 2006). 
30 Parker v Google Inc, 422 F Supp 2d 492, 497-498 (ED Pa, 2006). 
31 § 512(c) 17 USC. 
32 412 F Supp 2d 1106 (DC Nev, 2006). 
33 Parker v Google Inc, 422 F Supp 2d 492, 498-500 (ED Pa, 2006). 
34 280 F 3d 934 (9th Cir, 2002; withdrawn 9th Cir 3 July 2003). 
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between a commercial photographer and a company whose visual search engine 
enabled web users to search for images on the Internet. Results retrieved by the search 
engine were displayed in the form of thumbnail images of lower resolution and 
quality than the originals from which they were made. The thumbnail images 
contained inline links to the full-size images, so that by clicking on a thumbnail, a 
full-size version of the image, as it appeared on the copyright owner’s website, was 
displayed, as well as the webpage from which the image originated. In other words, 
the use of inline linking meant that the image displayed when a web user clicked on 
the thumbnail was the actual image that appeared on the copyright owner’s website. 
The plaintiff owned photographic images he had posted on his website on which he 
sold advertising space as well as books and travel packages. When the plaintiff found 
that the defendant had made thumbnail images of, and links to, his photographs, he 
objected and commenced proceedings against the defendant for copyright 
infringement. 
 
In 2002, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that while the plaintiff had established 
a prima facie case of copyright infringement by the defendant’s when they copied his 
photographs to create the thumbnail images, the defendant’s actions were not 
infringing, because based on a weighing of the factors set out in s 107 of the United 
States Copyright Act 1976, they were a fair use of the copyright works.35 This finding 
was based on the fact that the thumbnails were smaller, lower resolution images that 
served a different function to the plaintiff’s original images. In other words, whereas 
the defendant made the copies as part of is efforts to index and improve access to 
images on the web, the plaintiff used the images to portray scenery in an artistic 
manner and attract viewers to his website. Users were unlikely to enlarge the 
thumbnails and use them for artistic purposes because they were of much lower 
resolution than the originals.  
 
This meant that they were not suitable for use as substitutes for the originals and did 
not harm the market for the sale or licensing of the originals. By contrast, the display 
of the full-size version of the images as they appeared on the plaintiff’s website when 
a thumbnail was clicked, was held to be an infringement of the plaintiff’s exclusive 
right to publicly display the copyright work under s 106 of the United States 
Copyright Act. This was the case even though the use of inline linking meant that 
when a thumbnail was clicked the image that was displayed was imported directly 
from the plaintiff’s site and did not involve any copying of the images by the 
defendant. The Court held that the public display of the images was not a fair use 
because the defendant’s use of the images was not for a different purpose than the 
plaintiff’s use of them and the defendant’s use of the images was likely to divert web 
users away from the plaintiff’s site, thereby damaging the plaintiff’s market for sales 
and licensing of the images.  
 
The 9th Circuit’s 2002 decision was withdrawn and superseded by a subsequent 
decision of the same court in July 2003, which affirmed the finding that the 
defendant’s copying of the plaintiff’s photographs to create and retrieve the thumbnail 
images was a non-infringing fair use.36 However, the court avoided resolving the issue 
                                                 
35 Section 107 of the United States Copyright Act requires a consideration of four factors: the nature of 
the use of the work; the nature of the copyright work itself; the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyright work. 
36 Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp 336 F 3d 811 (9th Cir, 2003). 
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of whether the defendant’s inline linking to the full-size images of the plaintiff’s 
photographs also infringed copyright because the parties had not requested summary 
judgment on that point. After the parties failed to reach a settlement, default judgment 
was entered in favour of the plaintiff in March 2004.37 
 
4 Perfect 10 v Google Inc  
Similarly, in proceedings for an interlocutory injunction in Perfect 10 v Google Inc,38 
the Court concluded that the plaintiff, an adult-oriented website, was likely to succeed 
in copyright infringement proceedings against the defendant, whose Google image 
search engine displayed thumbnail images of the plaintiff’s copyright photographs.39 
When a search was conducted, each of the thumbnail images presented contained an 
inline link to the webpage on which the image in question had been located by 
Google’s search engine.  
 
The plaintiff was the owner of copyright photographs from which it derived revenue 
in various ways, including publication in a magazine, display on a subscription 
website and the licensing of a third party to sell thumbnails of the images for 
downloading to mobile phones. Google’s image search engine enables web users to 
search for images. When a web user conducts an image search, the Google search 
engine responds by presenting the user with thumbnail images created by Google 
from the original images it located on the Internet and which it stored on its own 
servers. The Court held that the plaintiff was likely to succeed in proving that Google 
was infringing copyright by creating and displaying the thumbnail images of the 
plaintiff’s photographs.40  
 
Furthermore, the court held that Google’s actions were not likely to be exempted from 
infringement as a fair use of the plaintiff’s copyright photographs, in light of the 
commercial nature of Google’s use of the photographs and the likelihood that 
Google’s activities would interfere with the market for the plaintiff’s photographs, 
since Perfect 10 sold similar size versions of the photographs to mobile phone users.41  
The court also found that Google’s practice of framing and inline linking to an image 
when a user conducts an image search did not infringe copyright.42 The Court’s 
rationale for this was that Google did not display the image within the meaning of the 
United States Copyright Act as Google only linked to the images which were 
available for download or viewing from a third party website.43   
 
In May 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 
Inc v Amazon.com Inc and Google Inc,44 overturned the District Court’s finding that 
Google’s actions were an infringement and unlikely to be a fair use. The Court held:  
 
                                                 
37 Judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff in the sum of US$345,000 plus attorney fees in the 
sum of US$6,068.20: see http://netcopyrightlaw.com/pdf/kellyvarribasoftjudgement03182004.pdf 
(accessed 26 February 2007).  
38 416 F Supp 2d 828 (CD Cal, 2006). 
39 Perfect 10 v Google Inc, 416 F Supp 2d 828, 858-859 (CD Cal, 2006). 
40 Perfect 10 v Google Inc, 416 F Supp 2d 828, 858-859 (CD Cal, 2006). 
41 Perfect 10 v Google Inc, 416 F Supp 2d 828, 845-851 (CD Cal, 2006). 
42 Perfect 10 v Google Inc, 416 F Supp 2d 828, 844-845 (CD Cal, 2006). 
43 Perfect 10 v Google Inc, 416 F Supp 2d 828, 838-844 (CD Cal, 2006). 
44 CV-05-04753-AHM (9th Cir, 16 May 2007). 
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[i]n this case, Google has put Perfect 10’s thumbnail images (along with millions of 
other thumbnail images) to a use fundamentally different than the use intended by 
Perfect 10. In doing so, Google has provided a significant benefit to the public. 
Weighing this significant transformative use against the unproven use of Google’s 
thumbnails for cell phone downloads, and considering the other fair use factors, all in 
light of the purpose of copyright, we conclude that Google’s use of Perfect 10’s 
thumbnails is a fair use. Because the district court here “found facts sufficient to 
evaluate each of the statutory factors . . . [we] need not remand for further 
factfinding.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation omitted). We 
conclude that Perfect 10 is unlikely to be able to overcome Google’s fair use defense 
and, accordingly, we vacate the preliminary injunction regarding Google’s use of 
thumbnail images.  
 
Interestingly, the Court also reversed the District Court’s findings on secondary 
liability, as it had failed to fully apply the doctrine of inducement articulated in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd,45. It is unclear what this will mean 
for the law of secondary liability for search engines. The Court held: 
 
[t]he district court also erred in its secondary liability analysis because it failed to 
consider whether Google and Amazon.com knew of infringing activities yet failed to 
take reasonable and feasible steps to refrain from providing access to infringing 
images. Therefore we must also reverse the district court’s holding that Perfect 10 
was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its secondary liability claims. Due to this 
error, the district court did not consider whether Google and Amazon.com are entitled 
to the limitations on liability set forth in title II of the DMCA. The question whether 
Google and Amazon.com are secondarily liable, and whether they can limit that 
liability pursuant to title II of the DMCA, raise fact intensive inquiries, potentially 
requiring further fact finding, and thus can best be resolved by the district court on 
remand. We therefore remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision. 
 
This decision will also be of interest in regard to the application of the safe harbors to 
search engines, as there have been some suggestions, that a strict or narrow reading of 
the provisions may make their potential application to some search engines 
problematic.46 On this view, it is uncertain how terms like ‘subscribers’ ‘account 
holders’ and ‘accounts’, which are pre-conditions to the operation of the safe harbors, 
will apply to search engines. One view, is that as search engines in their strictest sense 
do not have subscribers or account holders, then they may potentially lose their 
protection under the safe harbors, as they fail to satisfy the necessary pre-conditions.47 
 
5 Agence France Presse v Google Inc 
Agence France Presse and Google have recently settled a high profile media lawsuit – 
involving the popular Google news search – which was filed by Agence France Presse 
in a United States District Court for the District of Columbia in March 2005.48 Under 
                                                 
45 545 US 913, 930 (2005). 
46 Craig Walker ‘Application of the DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions to Search Engines’ (2004) 9(2) 
Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 1, 17; see for example 17 USC § 512(i); Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) s 116AH. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Caroline McCarthy, Agence France-Presse, Google settle copyright dispute (2007) CNET News 
<http://news.com.com/Agence+France-Presse%2C+Google+settle+copyright+dispute/2100-1030_3-
6174008.html>. 
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the agreement reached between both parties, Agence France Presse has agreed to 
allow Google to post Agence France Presse content, including new stories and 
photographs, to the Google News website and other Google services.49  
 
Agence France Presse had alleged that Google News infringed copyright by 
unlawfully including its photographs, headlines and excerpts from the beginning of 
articles (story leads) in the Google News search. Agence France Presse also alleged 
that Google was in breach of federal law by removing copyright management 
information (photo credits and copyright notices) from its copyright material. 
Countering these claims, Google argued that Agence France Presse’s headlines were 
not ‘original and creative’ enough to be protected under copyright law.50 
 
6 Viacom Inc v YouTube Inc and Google Inc  
It also worth noting that Google owned subsidiary, YouTube Inc is currently the 
subject of a high profile copyright lawsuit brought by Viacom International Inc in a 
United States District Court.51 In this case before the Southern District of New York, 
Viacom alleges six causes of action for copyright infringement against YouTube and 
Google, being: 
1. direct copyright infringement related to the unauthorised public performance 
of the uploaded videos; 
2. direct copyright infringement related to the unauthorised public display of  the 
uploaded videos;  
3. direct copyright infringement related to the unauthorised reproduction of the 
uploaded videos; 
4. inducement of copyright infringement; 
5. contributory copyright infringement; and 
6. vicarious copyright infringement.  
 
YouTube and Google’s defence, essentially denies each of the allegations in 
Viacom’s complaint and raises 12 defences in their favour. These defences include 
the safe harbors, licence, fair use, failure to mitigate, failure to state a claim, innocent 
intent, copyright misuse, estoppel, waiver, unclean hands, laches and substantial non-
infringing uses.52 
 
YouTube is also the subject of recent class action filed by the English Premier League 
and independent music publisher, Bourne Co in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York.53 The action essentially duplicates the claims 
made by Viacom in their complaint.54  
                                                 
49 Ibid.  
50 Declan McCullagh and Anne Broache, Judge: Google news lawsuit can proceed (2006) CNET News 
<http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-6095656.html>. 
51 Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Inc, (United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007).  For a copy of the complaint see 
Evan Brown, Viacom sues YouTube (2007) Internet Cases 
<http://www.internetcases.com/archives/2007/03/viacom_sues_you.html>; also see Greg Sandoval, 
Viacom sues Google over YouTube clips (2007) CNET News 
<http://news.com.com/Viacom+sues+Google+over+YouTube+clips/2100-1030_3-6166668.html>.  
52 See Elinor Mills, Google denies Viacom copyright charges (2007) CNET News 
<http://news.com.com/Google+denies+Viacom+copyright+charges/2100-1026_2-6180387.html>. 
53 The Football Association Premier League Limited and Bourne Co v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and 
Google Inc, (United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 4 May 2007); for 
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B Australia  
In Australia there is yet to be a major decision involving the liability of search engines 
for copyright infringement, although there have been a number of recent related 
decisions, particularly in regard to the area of ‘linking’ and whether linking to another 
website containing material that infringes copyright can amount to an authorisation of 
copyright infringement.55 It is likely that these decisions will have implications for 
search engine liability for copyright infringement in Australia. 
 
1 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper 
In Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper56, a decision of the Federal Court of 
Australia, Tamberlin J concluded that the defendant, by providing hyperlinks from his 
website to thousands of sound recordings located on remote websites, had authorised 
the infringement of copyright in music sound recordings, both by internet users who 
accessed his website and by the operators of the remote websites from which the 
infringing recordings were downloaded.57 The defendant operated a website called 
MP3s4free.net website, which did not host sound recordings, but provided hyperlinks 
which, when clicked, enabled users to directly access and activate the downloading of 
sound recordings on remote websites. When a visitor to the defendant’s website 
clicked on a link on that site to an MP3 file hosted on another server, the user’s 
browser sent a “GET” request to the server so that the MP3 file was transmitted 
directly on the internet from the host server to the user’s computer.58 
 
The defendant’s website was designed to, and did, facilitate and enable this infringing 
downloading. It would have been possible for the defendant to prevent the 
infringements by removing the hyperlinks from his website or by structuring the 
website in such a way that the operators of the remote websites from which MP3 files 
were downloaded could not automatically add hyperlinks to the defendant’s website 
without some supervision or control on his part. Tamberlin J explained: 
 
[A] website operator is always able to control the hyperlinks on his or her website, either by 
removal of the links or by requiring measures to be taken by the remote website operator prior 
to adding a hyperlink. A person cannot create a hyperlink between a music file and a website 
without the permission of the operator of the website because access to the code that is 
required to create the link must occur at level of the website. The Cooper website employed a 
“CGI-BIN” script to accept hyperlink suggestions from visitors to the website. By virtue of 
this script, such suggestions were automatically added to the website without the intervention 
of Cooper. The evidence is that alternative software was in existence that would have enabled 
a third party to add a hyperlink to a website but which required the consent or approval of the 
website operator before such hyperlinks were added.59 
                                                                                                                                            
more information see <http://www.youtubeclassaction.com>. Also see Tur v YouTube Inc, (CD Cal, 
2006), 797. 
54 See Greg Sandoval, Legal troubles mount for YouTube (2007) CNET News 
<http://news.com.com/Legal+troubles+mount+for+YouTube/2100-1030_3-6181753.html>. 
55 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1), (1A), 101(1), (1A); University of New South Wales v Moorhouse 
and Angus & Robertson (1975) 133 CLR 1; Universal City Studios Inc v Corley and 2600 Enterprises 
Inc, 273 F 3d 429 (2001). Also note in Australia and a number of other jurisdictions a defence to 
authorisation liability exists for the mere provision of communication facilities, for example see 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 39B, 112E. 
56 [2005] FCA 972. 
57 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005) [77]–[88]. 
58 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005) [65]. 
59 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005) [85]. 
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The defendant had sufficient control over his own website, both with regard to users 
accessing his website and remote operators placing hyperlinks on his website, that he 
could have taken steps to prevent the infringement.60 However, the defendant made no 
attempt, when hyperlinks were submitted to his website, to take any steps to ascertain 
the legality of the MP3s to which the hyperlinks related or the identity of the persons 
submitting the MP3s. Subsequently, it was held that the defendant had authorised the 
infringement of copyright in the sound recordings.61 
 
The first instance decision in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper62 by the 
Federal Court of Australia was upheld by the Full Court of the Federal Court of 
Australia in Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd63. In this case, taking into 
account the elements of s 101(A) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), the 
Court found that Cooper had authorised infringement because he:  
• had the power to prevent users of his website from infringing copyright by not 
making available the technical capacity for those acts to be committed; 
• benefited financially and therefore had a financial relationship with users 
whom he attracted to his website through sponsorship and advertising; and 
• did not take reasonable steps to prevent or avoid copyright infringement by 
users of his website.64 
 
Importantly, from the perspective of search engine liability, one of the Judges in this 
case briefly considered the legal position of search engines under Australian copyright 
law. The appellant (Cooper) submitted that his website was, in relevant respects, no 
different from a search engine, such as Google and attempted to rely upon the United 
States decision in Perfect 10 Inc v Google Inc,65. This argument was expressly 
rejected by Branson J who stated: 
 
 Mr Cooper placed considerable weight on a suggested analogy between his website and 
 Google. Two things may be said in this regard. First, Mr Cooper’s assumption that Google’s 
 activities in Australia do not result in infringements of the [Copyright] Act is untested. Perfect 
 10 Inc v  Google Inc 416 F Supp 2d 828 (CDCal 2006) upon which Mr Cooper placed reliance 
 is a decision under the law of the United States of America which includes the doctrine of 
 “fair use”. Secondly, Google is a general purpose search engine rather than a website designed 
 to facilitate the downloading of music files. The suggested analogy is unhelpful in the context 
 of Mr Cooper’s appeal.66 
 
 
C Europe 
Clearly, incorporating HTML code or content from the linked site onto the host site, 
may amount to a direct infringement of copyright if a substantial part of the original 
code or content has been taken. For example, where an internet search engine uses a 
robotic spider or crawler to automatically return search results from newspapers, 
                                                 
60 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005) [86]. 
61 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005) [88]. 
62 [2005] FCA 972 (Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005). 
63 [2006] FCAFC 187 (French, Branson and Kenny JJ, 18 December 2006).  
64 Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187 (French, Branson and Kenny JJ, 18 
December 2006) [41]–[51], [148]–[151]. 
65 F Supp 2d 828 (CD Cal 2006).  
66 Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187 (French, Branson and Kenny JJ, 18 
December 2006) [40]. 
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magazines and books, reproducing headlines, abstracts or articles or a few sentences 
of text from the retrieved items in a news amalgamation service, it could be argued 
that the newspaper publishers’ copyright has been infringed, providing a ‘substantial 
part’ of the item has been reproduced.67 In this regard, Google has been sued by a 
number of European newspaper publishers, who allege that the Google News service, 
which lists headlines and a few sentences of text from news articles that are linked 
back to the publications’ own websites, infringes copyright in their online newspaper 
content.68 
 
1 Copiepresse v Google Inc  
In a recent case brought in Belgium by Copiepresse, an organisation that manages 
copyright for Belgium’s French and German language newspapers, the court held that 
Google had infringed the newspaper publishers’ copyright by caching, making 
automatic summaries of and reproducing the newspapers’ materials on the Google 
News website. In September 2006, the President of the Court of First Instance of 
Brussels (Tribunal de Premiere Instance de Bruxelles) ordered Google to remove the 
articles, photographs and graphical images from the various Belgian newspapers on 
Google News and Google’s Belgian search website, imposing a penalty of up to 
€1million per day for continued infringements. The Court rejected Google’s argument 
that it was a non-infringing fair use to store cached copies of the newspaper articles 
and use short extracts from the articles on the Google News website. Google removed 
links to 17 of the newspapers from the Google News website and sought a rehearing 
of the case. In February 2007, the injunction was upheld but the Court reduced the 
penalty payable by Google (if it continued to reproduce infringing material on its 
website) to a maximum daily fine of €25 000. 
 
 
D China  
1 Seven Record Labels v Baidu.com Inc69     
Recent litigation in the Beijing No 1 Intermediate People’s Court has brought 
attention to the liability of search engines for copyright infringement in China. 
Chinese search Baidu was recently sued by seven record labels, including EMI Group 
Hong Kong, Sony BMG Music Hong Kong, Warner Music Hong Kong, Universal 
Music Hong Kong, Cinepoly Music, Go East Entertainment and Gold Label 
Entertainment. The record companies claimed that Baidu’s act of linking songs to the 
public on the Internet infringed the communication right of the record companies 
under Chinese law. 
 
At issue in this case was whether Baidu through their MP3 search engine service70 
had communicated MP3 songs to the public by allowing users to search and download 
illegal MP3 files through the Baidu MP3 search engine service. The nature of the 
Baidu MP3 search engine service, was such that Baidu did not directly upload MP3 
                                                 
67 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 13 (2), 36(1) and 101(1). 
68 Copiepresse v Google Inc No 2006/9099/4 Tribunal de premiére instance de Bruxelles 8 September 
2006; Copiepresse v Google Inc No 06/10.928/C Tribunal de premiére instance de Bruxelles 13 
February 2007; Agence France Presse v Google Inc, US District Court (District of Columbia). Note in 
November 2006, Google reached a settlement with the Belgian copyright organisations, Sofam, 
representing about 3 700 photographers, and Scam, which represents journalists.  
69 Note this name refers to a number of separate cases brought against Baidu.  
70 See Baidu MP3 http://mp3.baidu.com. 
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files to their servers, instead they only provided the links to the MP3 files stored on 
other servers. 
 
The Court held that the ‘sampled’ and ‘downloaded’ MP3 files in question did not 
originate from the Baidu website, instead they originated from other web servers.71 
Thus the Court found that the communication occurs between the users downloading 
the MP3 files and the website that uploaded the files.72 The Court clearly ruled that 
the website providing the links does not engage in the act of communication via the 
Internet under the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China.73    
 
Importantly for search engines, the Court also held that there was insufficient basis for 
a search engine to be held liable for the uploading and downloading of infringing 
sound recordings, by third party websites. The rationale behind this finding was that 
search engines are unable to determine the legal status of linked websites.  
 
 
IV SEARCH ENGINES AND COPYRIGHT LAW: THE 
FUTURE  
 
Search engines, such as Google, Yahoo and Baidu are critical to accessing knowledge 
in the Internet environment. They enable Internet users to find and retrieve 
information and documents, trawling the internet using ‘robots’ and caching material 
for ease of access and presentation. It is therefore essential, that copyright laws 
accommodate the great potential which search engines have to offer society and 
ensure the free flow of information on the Internet.  
 
In many jurisdictions throughout the world there still remains uncertainty as to 
whether search engines can be held liable for infringing copyright. In particular, 
provisions regarding the caching of copyright material, the extent to which fair use or 
fair dealing will apply, secondary or authorisation liability and the operation of safe 
harbour provisions all need to be clarified from the perspectives of search engines. 
Compounding this uncertainty is the lack of clear judicial precedent regarding search 
engine liability for copyright infringement.  
 
One example of this is under the Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), which fails to 
clarify whether a search engine will be entitled to the protection of the Australian 
‘safe harbour’ provisions. Similar, ambiguity exists in regard to the potential 
application of the fair dealing defence for search engines and whether the practice of 
caching by search engines will constitute a reproduction and subsequently infringe 
copyright law in Australia. This example illustrates the type of uncertainty which 
exists under national copyright laws when considering search engines and the 
increasingly diverse operations which they provide.       
 
                                                 
71 Wang Qian, ‘A “Direct” Decision vs. an “Indirect” Problem: A Commentary on Seven Record 
Labels vs. Baidu.com’ (2007) 1 Journal of China Copyright. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. Note that on 24 April 2007 the Beijing Second Intermediary Court reached a different 
conclusion, finding Yahoo! China liable for copyright infringement for links in its music search results.    
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In order to create further certainty in this area the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) through its member states should convene a conference on 
search engine liability. Such a conference could assess in detail the effectiveness of 
the current law in allowing search engines to operate without fear of being sued. A 
more radical proposal, which could be tabled at such a conference, would be to allow 
search engines the broadest possible immunity to operate in hope that they might 
vastly improve our ability to research, manage and process knowledge for social, 
cultural and economic good. An intermediate proposal would be to simply assess the 
series of cases discussed in this chapter and provide clarity under law in all 
jurisdictions about the legality of the activities of search engines. 
 
Ultimately one of the aims of copyright law is to find a workable balance between the 
right to own and exploit information in the form of creative expression and the ability 
of users (and their intermediaries) to access and reuse informational resources 
especially in a knowledge economy. The complicating factor in these circumstances is 
that in the process of providing access to knowledge, companies like Google, Baidu 
and Yahoo make an enormous amount of money, at the expense, so it is argued, of the 
copyright owners. Some of the reproduction and communication that search engines 
engage in to bring us our daily fix of information clearly must be tolerated in order for 
the system to work. In many instances such access will also promote the interests of 
the copyright owner through greater profiling. The sticking point here is not so much 
about whether search engines should be given greater immunity from liability but 
about how much advertising revenue they are willing to share with copyright owners 
for buying such immunity.   
 
 
V CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has highlighted the stream of litigation that has confronted the operators 
of search engines in the last two years across the world. It is our suggestion that such 
a trend should be arrested by a closer analysis (through an international conference 
convened by WIPO) of the scope of immunity search engines currently possess and 
proposals for how and on what conditions it should be expanded. This involves the 
consideration of many competing interests and the resolution of difficult policy 
questions but the foundational importance of search engines to our 21st existence 
makes such a process vitally important to economic and social prosperity. In short, 
search engines are now a key part of our everyday lives and to this end we should 
ensure that their freedom to operate is clearly articulated and reinforced in law.   
 
 
 
 
